















The Role of religion in economic and demographic behavior in the US:









  Department of Economics 
University of Granada 
SPAIN 
 
http://www.ener-online.org      




The Role of Religion in Economic and Demographic Behavior in the United States: 
A Review of the Recent Literature* 
by 
 
Evelyn L. Lehrer, IZA, Bonn and  
Department of Economics 
 University of Illinois at Chicago, 
601 South Morgan Street 









I am indebted to Alicia Adsera, Carmel Chiswick, Chris Ellison, Jennifer Glass, and Lisa 
Pearce for valuable comments, and to Ramona Krauss and Zhenxiang Zhao for skillful 
research assistance.   1
The Role of Religion in Economic and Demographic Behavior in the United States: 
A Review of the Recent Literature 
 
  The past few years have witnessed substantial progress in our understanding of 
how religious factors influence economic and demographic factors including education, 
female employment, fertility, and union formation and dissolution. In this paper I 
highlight results from recent studies on the role of religion in these and related economic 
and demographic behaviors, updating the critical literature review presented in an earlier 
article (Lehrer 2004a). Based on the theoretical framework suggested there, I also offer a 
reinterpretation of previous findings in the literature and identify promising avenues for 
future research. The focus of this review is on the United States, but a few closely related 
studies that employ data from other countries are also included. 
     
A REINTERPRETATION OF PREVIOUS FINDINGS 
  Analyses to date of how religion influences economic and demographic behavior 
have generally examined one relationship at a time, e.g., the religion-fertility linkage, the 
religion-female labor supply linkage, and so on. The broader perspective offered recently 
(Lehrer 2004a, 2000b), which emphasizes that in understanding any given relationship it 
is essential to consider the full picture, suggests  a reinterpretation of previous findings in 
the literature and points towards a new direction for future analyses. 
  In his pioneering research and subsequent work, Goldscheider (1971, 1999, 2006) 
has made a distinction between fertility differences among religious groups that are 
attributable to (a) differences in socioeconomic and other demographic characteristics;   2
and (b) specific teachings of the religion such as norms regarding contraception, and 
more importantly, broader value orientations and worldviews associated with the religion 
such as pronatalism or gender inequalities. Influenced by this theoretical framework, the 
approach that has generally been used in the literature to study how religion affects a 
particular demographic or economic outcome is to first estimate a zero order regression 
model, including only religion variables, and then add controls for other demographic and 
socio-economic factors. For example, Mosher et al. (1992) report results on overall 
differences in fertility between various religious groups, and the differences that remain 
after controlling for a series of demographic and socioeconomic variables including 
education. Yet religious affiliation has a substantial impact on investments in human 
capital (Chiswick 1988; Lehrer 1999b). Thus when a control for education is added to a 
fertility regression, the new, smaller coefficients on the religion variables leave out the 
indirect influence of religion on fertility via its impact on such investments. 
  This point applies to each of the other realms of economic and demographic 
behavior. For instance, in their analysis of the relationship between religious 
intermarriage and marital stability between waves I and II of the National Survey of 
Families and Households, Call and Heaton (1997) first report a zero order regression, and 
then another with controls for socioeconomic and demographic variables, including the 
birth of a child between the waves. The coefficient on the religious intermarriage variable 
becomes smaller in magnitude and loses all significance in this second regression. But 
religious intermarriage may lead to a reduced level of investments in spouse-specific 
human capital, children in particular, thus increasing the probability of marriage   3
dissolution (Becker et al. 1977; Lehrer 1996). The small, insignificant coefficient on 
religious intermarriage in the second regression leaves out this indirect effect. 
  Future analyses should make a careful distinction between variables that are not 
influenced by religion, such as age, race, and ethnicity, properly held constant in the 
second regression, and those that are, such as investments in various forms of human 
capital, which should be excluded. This second regression would provide information on 
the total effects of religion. One might be tempted to go on to estimate a third regression 
including the latter variables so as to distinguish between direct and indirect influences, 
e.g., in the case of the religion-marital stability linkage discussed above, adding a 
variable for the birth of a child; however, marital stability and fertility are jointly 
determined. Thus this third step would generally be possible only when having access to 
a data set, or combination of data sets, rich enough to contain instruments that could be 
used to take these endogeneity issues into account.  
 
RELIGION AND DEMOGRAPHIC OUTCOMES 
  An early study by Williams and Zimmer (1990) found that Catholics in Rhode 
Island had substantially higher fertility than non-Catholics, contrary to results that had 
begun to suggest an end to high Catholic fertility in the U.S. as a whole (Westoff and 
Jones 1979). The Williams-Zimmer study was among the first empirical analyses to 
emphasize the importance of the community context: Rhode Island is different from other 
states in that Catholics there constitute a majority. Similar analyses would probably 
reveal that the influence of religious factors on the demographic behavior of Jews in New 
York or Mormons in Utah differs substantially from that for their counterparts in places   4
with smaller concentrations of coreligionists. McQuillan's (2004) work is an effort to 
advance our understanding of why the effects of religion on fertility vary across locations 
and over time. He presents evidence suggesting that religion matters when the religious 
institutions are able to articulate norms that are relevant to fertility and have the means to 
enforce compliance, and when individuals have a strong sense of attachment to their 
religious community. Berman et al. (2006) also emphasize the critical role of religious 
institutions, in a different dimension, namely, the extent to which they provide health, 
education, and other social services that affect the monetary costs of having children.  
  Fertility in the U.S. is considerably higher than that in most European countries, 
and indeed contrary to trends in other industrialized nations, the United States appears to 
be experiencing a baby boomlet; data for 2006 reveal the largest number of births since 
1961 (Hamilton et al. 2007). Recent analyses of data for 13 developed countries shows 
that the ideal family size of individuals who have some religious affiliation is higher than 
that of their unaffiliated counterparts (Adsera 2006a), and for the case of Spain, a higher 
level of religiosity is associated with a faster tempo of births and also with higher 
fertility, by a small margin (Adsera 2006b). Related work for the United States shows 
that among more religious individuals both current and intended fertility are higher 
(Hayford and Morgan 2008). Although these results must be interpreted as purely 
descriptive, because religiosity is measured as of the survey date in the three studies, the 
results are suggestive of a positive influence of religiosity on fertility. An interesting 
question is the extent to which the difference in fertility between the U.S. and Europe is 
related to the much higher levels of religiosity and traditional family orientation that 
characterize the U.S. Analyses by Frejka and Westoff (2008) show that if the European   5
countries had the same religiosity levels as the U.S., the fertility of women 18-44 would 
be higher than current levels by 13-14% (depending on the measure of religiosity used).   
  With regard to mortality, another major demographic outcome, previous studies 
have shown that some involvement in religious activities is generally associated with 
beneficial effects on health and survival rates (Waite and Lehrer 2003). A recent critical 
literature review concludes that there is strong evidence supporting a connection between 
public religious attendance and mortality risk, with weaker evidence for the case of 
private religious activities (Hummer et al. 2004). However, the question of whether or to 
what extent participation in religious activities causes better health outcomes remains 
controversial  (e.g., see Bagiella et al. 2005, Hummer 2005). Related work on self-
reported happiness, a proxy for overall well-being, shows that attendance to religious 
services can help buffer an individual's happiness against income shocks-- a finding that 
has implications for governmental provision of insurance (Dehejia et al. 2007). Although 
the linkages between religion and health/ well-being can have other, potentially far 
reaching economic implications, with few exceptions (Woodberry 2006) they have 
received virtually no attention in the literature to date.  It is noteworthy also that 
participation in religious activities has been found to promote cooperative behavior, 
enhancing well-being for the entire community (Sosis and Ruffle 2003).  
 
RELIGION AND SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
  Earlier work has discussed possible pathways of causality linking religious 
affiliation and participation to schooling outcomes and educational attainment, key 
determinants of economic wellbeing (Chiswick 1988; Lehrer 1999b). Recent research   6
suggests that religious factors are associated with the level of conflict between the parents 
(Curtis and Ellison 2002), domestic violence (Ellison et al. 1999), the degree of fathers' 
involvement with their children (King 2003, Wilcox 2004), the quality of mother-child 
relations (Pearce and Axinn 1998), and parenting styles and approaches to child 
discipline (Bartkowski and Wilcox 2000, Bartkowski et al. 2000). These studies suggest a 
number of other channels, which deserve further attention and quantification, through 
which religion may affect the home environment, the quality and quantity of informal 
investments in children's human capital, and educational outcomes. 
  Substantial progress has been made in recent years in understanding the effects of 
religion on other socioeconomic outcomes including labor supply, wages, and wealth. 
With regard to labor supply, although there is heterogeneity within conservative religious 
groups regarding views on appropriate roles for women and men (Gay et al. 1996), 
conservative Protestant groups generally provide psychological rewards and 
institutionalized moral support to women who stay home with their young children, and  
there is growing evidence of a distinctive pattern of female labor supply behavior among 
such groups (Lehrer 1995, 1999a; Sherkat 2000; Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 
2006). Substantial, related differences in wages have also been found; thus future 
economic analyses of the male-female wage gap-- its magnitude, causes, and changes 
over time-- should consider the role of religious factors, including the growth of 
conservative Protestant denominations in the U.S. (Glass and Nath 2006, Lehrer 2008a). 
The possible role of religion on the labor supply behavior of men has received less 
attention in the literature, as it is unusual for prime-aged men to depart from a pattern of 
full- time work. Research in progress is examining this issue (Civettini and Glass 2008).   7
 
  Religion has also been found to have a large impact on wealth, both directly, by 
defining worthwhile objectives (oriented to this world and/or the afterlife) and providing 
tools for the development of savings and investment strategies, and indirectly, through its 
effects on education, fertility, and labor supply behavior (Keister 2003, 2005, 2008a, 
2008b). Wealth differentials by religion mirror the patterns that have been found for 
education and wages: conservative Protestants have the lowest levels of wealth; Jews are 
at the other end of the spectrum, and mainline Protestants and Catholics are at the center 
of the distribution. 
            
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS DISSIMILARITY 
  The most recent study on this topic shows that the prevalence of religious 
intermarriage in the U.S. has been rising for all groups except conservative Protestants 
(Sherkat 2004), confirming the patterns found in earlier work (Lehrer 1998).  Differences 
in religious affiliation between husband and wife have repercussions for marital stability, 
depending in part on the ecumenical/ exclusivist nature of the religions (Lehrer and 
Chiswick 1993) and such differences may also affect fertility and female labor supply 
(Becker et al. 1977; Lehrer 1995, 1996). Recent studies have found further confirmation 
for the importance of religious heterogamy for marital stability (Kalmijn et al. 2005), 
fertility (Adsera 2006b, 2006c), and female labor supply (Glass and Nath 2006). 
  New findings on the age at marriage--divorce relationship suggest that the 
implications of religious intermarriage for marital stability (and hence also for fertility 
and female labor supply) may vary by age at marriage (Lehrer 2008b). In this recent work   8
I found that women who are unconventional in marrying for the first time in their late 
twenties or thirties tend to be unconventional also in being more likely to wed partners 
who have had a previous marriage and who differ from them substantially in age, 
education, race/ ethnicity, and also religion; yet their marriages are very stable. I 
interpreted these results as reflecting the importance of Valerie Oppenheimer's (1988) 
"maturity effect"-- the greater emotional maturity that comes with older ages, the better 
self-knowledge, and the greater ability to assess the likely trajectory of potential partners. 
A greater appreciation of the benefits from marriage--especially having a partner with 
whom to have and raise a child-- probably plays an important role also. Thus it seems 
likely that replication of earlier analyses in the literature separately by age at entry into 
first marriage would reveal that the destabilizing effect associated with religious 
intermarriage is small or non-existent in the sub-sample of late entrants into first 
marriage. The potential fruitfulness of this line of investigation is suggested by the 
current trend towards increasingly delayed entry into first formal union (Lehrer 2008b).  
  Differences in religion between the parents lead to subsequent religious 
dissimilarity between at least one parent and the children, generating a potential source of 
conflict within the family; such intergenerational dissimilarity may arise also in 
households where the parents share the same religious affiliation, if a child chooses to 
follow a different path. Sherkat and Darnell (1999) find that conservative Protestant 
parents are less willing to make investments in higher education for children who do not 
follow their faith. Recent work has also found an association between parent-child 
religious dissimilarity and child's law abiding behavior: when the mother is very religious   9
and the child is not, or viceversa, there is an elevated risk of adolescent delinquency 
(Pearce and Hayne 2004).   
  
TWO WAYS IN WHICH RELIGIOSITY MATTERS 
FOR DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 
  Commitment to religion--in its various manifestations, including the strength of 
religious beliefs and the extent of participation in private and public religious activities--
can affect demographic and economic behavior via two major pathways. First, a higher 
level of religiosity may be expected to accentuate the effects of religious affiliation, e.g., 
the tendency for conservative Protestant women to display low levels of employment 
when young children are present in the household should be most pronounced among 
highly observant conservative Protestant couples. Second, the generally beneficial effects 
of religiosity on health and well-being can have important implications for economic and 
demographic outcomes, e.g., children raised with some religious involvement in their 
lives tend to have better performance in school and to achieve a higher level of 
educational attainment. Analyses in the literature to date typically consider only one of 
these two pathways of causality. More recent work emphasizes the importance of taking 
both into account: the two pathways may exert countervailing influences, and in addition, 
the effects of religiosity may vary by religious affiliation (Lehrer 2006, 2008a).  
  The growing body of evidence showing that some involvement in religious 
activity is associated with better schooling outcomes has implications for the literature on 
the benefits of attendance to Catholic schools (e.g., Neal 1997; Altonji et al. 2005). 
Cohen-Zada and Sander (2008) note that most of these studies have failed to consider the   10
comparatively high level of religiosity among children enrolled in Catholic schools, thus 
overstating the advantage associated with attendance to such schools with regard to test 
scores, high-school graduation rates, and other educational outcomes. 
  Analyses that have found beneficial influences of religiosity on various health and 
economic outcomes have generally specified religiosity as either a continuous religious 
participation variable, or a dichotomous variable for high versus low attendance to 
religious services. Chiswick and Huang (2007) use a set of dummy variables for various 
levels of participation, thus allowing for the possibility of non-linearities. Based on data 
from the 2000/2001 National Jewish Population Survey, they find that individuals who 
attend religious services weekly have significantly higher earnings than those who attend 
less frequently, supporting the hypothesis that some religious involvement has a 
beneficial effect on labor market outcomes; however, those who attend religious services 
more than weekly have lower earnings than those who attend weekly. The authors 
suggest that beyond a point, time and effort allocated to religious activities begins to 
crowd out time and effort that could be oriented to labor market activities. They also 
point out that discrimination in the labor market and lifestyle restrictions associated with 
the Orthodox denomination may play a role.  
  Unusually high rates of participation are often associated with extreme positions 
that may not be conducive to wellbeing, and non-linearities may emerge for this reason as 
well. A recent study of intimate partner violence in Chile finds that college women raised 
with some religious involvement in their lives are less likely to experience intimate 
partner violence, a result traced to their generally healthier, less risky lifestyles. However, 
there is no protective effect for women raised with high levels of religious participation.   11
Such women probably include many raised with extreme views and role models, where 
the sacredness of family unity is seen as foremost even in the face of spousal abuse, and 
where submissiveness is viewed as a key female quality (Lehrer et al. 2007). Future 
research should use statistical specifications that allow for possible non-linearities. The 
key question is whether beyond a certain point, further increases in the level of religiosity 
have an insignificant or even adverse influence. 
  Related to this, although the U.S. literature on religion and health overwhelmingly 
points towards benefits associated with religion, there are exceptions, particularly in the 
area of sexuality. The abstinence-only programs advocated by conservative religious 
groups have been found to be ineffective in reducing the risk of pregnancy or sexually 
transmitted diseases among teens (Kirby 2001, Trenholm et al. 2007), and while most 
studies have found that high levels of religiosity are associated with delayed sexual debut, 
results to date on the connection between religiosity and sexual risk behaviors among 
sexually active adolescents have been mixed (Whitehead et al. 2001). A better, more 
nuanced understanding of the effects of religion on health and economic outcomes 
requires further attention to these and other important exceptions. 
 
SMALLER RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC/ RACIAL GROUPS 
  Most of the studies in the U.S. literature on the role of religion in economic and 
demographic behavior have been based on samples of non-Hispanic whites, with a focus 
on the large religious groups-- Catholics, mainline Protestants, and conservative 
Protestants. Recent research has begun to analyze samples of racial/ ethnic and religious 
minorities (Warner 2002; Read 2004; Glass and Jacobs 2005; Wilcox and Wolfinger   12
2006; C. Chiswick 2007, 2008; B. Chiswick 2008). Further research on these smaller 
groups would be desirable. The "no-religion" group, which grew in size from 8% of the 
population in 1990 to over 14% in 2001, also deserves additional attention (Kosmin and 
Keysar 2006). 
     
MEASUREMENT AND STATISTICAL ISSUES 
  Much of what we know about the connection between religion and economic/ 
demographic behavior is based on analyses that use only two indicators of religion: broad 
categories of religious affiliation and frequency of attendance to religious services, 
usually measured during childhood. Recent research suggests the fruitfulness of 
considering more detailed categories of religious affiliation (Barrett et al. 2007); a richer 
array of dimensions of religion, including beliefs (e.g., in the existence of God, miracles, 
the inerrancy of the Bible), the salience of religion, and private religiosity (Idler et al. 
2003; Kosmin and Keysar 2006; Glass and Nath 2006); and measures of parental 
religious affiliation and participation (Pearce and Thornton 2007; Branas-Garza and 
Neuman 2007).   
  One of the main reservations expressed with regard to results that show beneficial 
effects of religious participation in various areas is that such effects may be overstated, 
because the estimates include the influence of unmeasured positive characteristics that 
are correlated with religiosity (e.g., Freeman 1986; Regnerus and Smith 2005). For 
example, if parents who encourage their children to attend religious services also tend to 
encourage them to do their homework and engage in other constructive behaviors, part of 
the observed positive association between religious participation and educational   13
outcomes would reflect the influence of these other behaviors. However, to the extent 
that religious participation is especially beneficial for those who are more vulnerable (for 
reasons that might include poor health, unfavorable family circumstances, and adverse 
economic conditions), the estimated coefficients may actually understate the true effect of 
religiosity (Lehrer 2004c). Thus although the most serious concern expressed in this 
literature has been that the estimates overstate the effects, it may well be the case that the 
opposite is true.  
  Recent work by Barro and McCleary (2003) and Gruber (2005) uses instrumental 
variables methods to estimate the causal effects of participation in religious activities; 
additional efforts in this direction would be desirable. This approach offers promise in 
addressing endogeneity issues in connection with the effects of religious intermarriage 
(as discussed in Lehrer and Chiswick (1993), the same unobserved factors that lead an 
individual to enter an interfaith marriage may later influence the stability of the union); 
with the controversial religiosity- health relationship; and with the linkages between 
religiosity and each of the economic and demographic behaviors discussed in this article. 
While the theoretical arguments for these linkages are compelling and the evidence 
accumulated to date suggests that the magnitudes of the effects are likely not trivial, we 
need additional research that addresses concerns of reverse causality and confounding 
factors.  
 
   14
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  The studies reviewed here describe the effects of religion on various economic 
and demographic behaviors, including education, female employment, wealth, fertility, 
and union formation and dissolution. Causality also flows in the opposite direction, and 
there is a growing literature that seeks to understand how economic and demographic 
variables influence the extent and form of involvement in religious activities, the process 
of switching from one religious affiliation to another, and other dimensions of religious 
behavior (for some recent contributions, see Branas-Garza and Neuman 2004; Barro and 
Hwang 2007; Zhai et al. 2007; C. Chiswick 2008; Waite and Lewin 2008). A major 
challenge that lies ahead is the need to do more to understand and model the reciprocal 
influences linking religion and economic/demographic behavior. The impressive recent 
advances in the field reviewed in this article bode well for continued progress. 
   15
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